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Thomas Suddendorf is Professor 
of Psychology at the University of 
Queensland, Australia. He was born 
and raised in Germany, but has spent 
most of his adult life in the Antipodes. 
He studies the development of 
mental capacities in young children 
and in nonhuman animals to answer 
fundamental questions about the 
nature and evolution of the human 
mind. He has received honors and 
distinctions for both his research 
and teaching, including awards from 
the Association for Psychological 
Science, the Australian Academy of 
Social Sciences, and the American 
Psychological Association. He 
has published in over 40 different 
scientific journals, including a paper 
in Behavioral and Brain Sciences on 
the evolution of foresight (co-authored 
with Mike Corballis) that Thomson 
Reuters recognized as one of the most 
highly cited in the field of neuroscience 
and behaviour. His new book The 
Gap — The Science of What Separates 
Us from Other Animals (NY: Basic 
Books) has been endorsed by various 
luminaries, including Jane Goodall 
and Richard Leakey, and has attracted 
outstanding reviews in scientific 
journals, including Nature and Science, 
and the press, including The Times and 
The Wall Street Journal, alike.
What drew you to research on animal 
cognition and human evolution? As 
far back as I can remember, I have 
been fascinated by questions about 
why we are the peculiar species that 
we are. Why are humans, and not, say, 
baboons, running the zoos? Where 
do we come from and where are 
we going? During my adolescence I 
became disenchanted with the Catholic 
doctrine that we were taught in the 
small German town I grew up in. So 
I turned to science in general and 
biology in particular to gain a better 
understanding of nature and our place 
within it. Most of my psychological 
research, in one way or another, is still 
driven by these big questions. 
How did you end up down under? 
After completion of civil service as an 
ambulance man, I went backpacking 
through South-East Asia and 
Q & A discovered my love of travelling. I was fascinated by the novelties in 
the cultures and natural worlds I 
encountered. Upon my return I started 
studying psychology in Münster 
Germany, but promptly plotted further 
travels. I eventually moved to New 
Zealand to study for my Masters degree 
and stayed on to complete my PhD. As 
the job opportunities for a psychologist 
with an evolutionary perspective turned 
out to be rather limited in New Zealand, 
I moved across the Tasman Sea to take 
up a lectureship at the University of 
Queensland — and I liked it so much 
that I am still there. 
Did your career benefit from the move 
down under? I think it gave me greater 
freedom. I was very lucky to find a 
brilliant mentor in Michael Corballis 
at the University of Auckland, who 
allowed me to pursue ideas that ran 
counter to the prevailing Zeitgeist. For 
instance, the evolutionary approach 
to psychology in the 1990s was 
dominated by the ‘Santa Barbara 
School of Thought’, which emphasized 
a domain-specific view of the mind, 
whereas I was interested in the domain-
general processes responsible for the 
tremendous flexibility of the human 
mind. I was especially interested in 
foresight, given the dramatic fitness 
benefits we gain from considering the 
future, whereas research in cognitive 
psychology was much more focused 
on memory processes. 
I found an idyllic houseboat that 
was moored in the swamps of Waiheke 
Island and wrote a Master’s thesis on the 
role of what I called ‘mental time travel’ 
in the evolution of the human mind. I 
proposed that episodic memory and our 
capacity to imagine future situations are 
intimately linked in mind and brain, and 
that the development of these capacities 
in our forebears was a prime mover 
in human evolution — for instance, 
because it allowed us to flexibly prepare 
for future threats and opportunities. 
That my ideas were unfashionable 
became clear when I tried to get them 
published — I think I resubmitted the 
paper eight times and eventually had 
to settle, after three years of trying, for 
a small journal I expected no one to 
read. But eventually some people did. 
You just wrote a book, ‘The Gap’, 
about what sets humans apart from 
other animals do you believe in some 
kind of human exceptionalism? No. 
Biology makes it plain that we are just another species of primate. As Gilbert 
and Sullivan put it so memorably: 
“Darwinian Man, though well behaved 
at best is only a monkey shaved”. While 
such reminders of our animal nature 
are a counterweight to the common 
notion that humans are somehow at the 
apex of existence, I think this should 
not obscure the fact that we are rather 
peculiar. Of course, every species is 
unique, and in that sense humans are 
no different. But I want to know why 
we have changed the face of the Earth 
and control much animal and plant life, 
whereas even our closest animal kin 
have remained unobtrusively in their 
forests. We have been extraordinarily 
successful, adding up to several times 
the biomass of all other wild terrestrial 
vertebrates combined. So I think the 
differences between us and other 
animals deserves careful scientific 
attention. Over 10 years ago, I set out 
to collate the relevant evidence and 
integrate it into this book to clarify 
what is known about the nature of this 
gap — it feels like my life’s work. 
Why have we not long established 
a scientific consensus on this 
fundamental question? Establishing 
the mental capacities of other 
creatures is a difficult task that requires 
careful tests that rule out alternative, 
leaner explanations. Establishing the 
absence of capacities is even more 
difficult, because a universal negative 
claim only requires one compelling 
case to reject it. Only when we give 
species many opportunities to show 
us a capacity and they consistently 
fail, can we gain confidence that the 
trait does not exist. After all, absence 
of evidence is not to be mistaken for 
evidence of absence.
Furthermore, when it comes to 
humans and our position in nature, I 
think there is a risk that preconceived 
notions about how the world should 
be may influence what researchers do 
and how they interpret what they find. 
Comparative psychology sometimes 
seems to be a field divided between 
those who are keen to demonstrate 
sophisticated animal capacities and 
those who are particularly reluctant 
to do so. Dan Dennett calls them the 
romantics and the killjoys. Debates 
between these factions over rich and 
lean interpretations of animal behavior 
are persistent, and there have been 
few attempts at reconciliation and 
integration into larger explanatory 
frameworks. 
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l So are you a romantic or a killjoy? 
Both (or should I say neither). Often the 
extreme positions are not as far apart 
as they at first appear. For example, 
animal capacities may be much 
more sophisticated and varied than 
we currently know, and nonetheless 
the human mind may be profoundly 
different. Even the apparently 
irreconcilable disagreement over 
whether there is a difference in kind 
that sets us apart from animals and 
Darwin’s belief that human and animal 
minds only differ in degree, may in fact 
both contain elements of the truth. We 
know that changes in degree frequently 
produce distinct attributes that may 
well be regarded as a difference in kind: 
just think of the effect gradual increases 
in temperature have on the properties 
of H2O. Similarly, gradual changes in 
working memory capacity can lead 
to radically different possibilities of 
thinking. Other stark disagreements 
sometimes simply reflect differences 
in opinion about the relevant criteria 
rather than about matters of fact. To 
demonstrate language, for instance, 
is it enough to demonstrate that other 
animals communicate, or must they be 
able to have debates or tell stories? 
Rather than trying to defend human 
superiority or to debunk human 
arrogance, I aim to provide a balanced 
overview of the current knowledge 
about the abilities and limits of mental 
abilities of animals. There is no point 
in denying our primate heritage, nor in 
belittling that we have extraordinary 
powers. I think of my book as a starting 
point, a call to arms, if you like, towards 
a dispassionate science of what we 
share and what sets us apart from other 
animals. 
By contrasting humans with 
animals, are you assuming there is 
something like ‘the animal condition’? 
Although some traditional views have 
assumed that non-human animals 
have essentially the same learning 
capacities, we now know that that 
is not the case. In fact, there is 
considerable research documenting 
the distinct cognitive capacities of, for 
instance, various species of primates 
and corvids. I suspect we are only 
scratching the surface. We need more 
research on other species. There are 
likely more, and more diverse, animal 
cognitive capacities than is widely 
assumed, and they may not only be 
found in big-brained vertebrates. The 
behaviors of, for instance, octopi or Queensland jumping spiders 
suggest that convergent evolution has 
produced a range of other means of 
driving clever behavior. 
When one is interested in human 
evolution, comparisons to our closest 
surviving animal relatives, chimpanzees 
(Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan 
paniscus), are of particular interest, 
and I have conducted studies with 
chimpanzees for that very reason. 
Remember, however, that chimpanzees 
are more closely related to us than to 
the other African apes, the gorillas. So 
from the perspective of chimpanzees, 
we are their closest relatives. In some 
sense, therefore, studying them may tell 
us more about ‘the human condition’ 
than about ‘the animal condition’.
What is your favorite experiment? 
That is a tough question given that 
there are many fascinating and clever 
studies in animal cognition. If pressed, 
I would probably single out a brilliant 
experiment by Victoria Horner and 
Andrew Whiten in which they presented 
chimpanzees and human children with 
a puzzle box and showed them how 
one can get a treat inside. The process 
involved first poking a stick into a hole 
at the top part of the apparatus and 
then inserting it in another hole further 
below. Both chimpanzees and children 
readily copied both actions of the 
model to retrieve the reward; however, 
when the apparatus was made out 
of transparent material it became 
patently obvious that the first action, 
poking into the top, had no causal 
role in the opening of the box, and in 
this condition chimpanzees simply 
poked the stick into the lower hole to 
obtain the reward, whereas the children 
continued to copy the superfluous 
first action. This is a wonderful study 
because in one sense the chimpanzees 
acted more efficiently, and arguably 
more rationally, than the children — and 
yet, the copying of unnecessary acts 
by children demonstrates a potentially 
critical human capacity for faithful 
transmission of cultural knowledge and 
for accumulation. Human culture can 
be maintained over generations without 
shortsighted youngsters abandoning all 
the hard-learned lessons. 
What is the best advice you’ve been 
given? The first thing to spring to 
mind is a valuable piece of advice 
Russell Gray gave me before I left 
the University of Auckland to take 
on a lectureship at the University of Queensland: “Learn to say: No”. I am 
still trying to get better at that one.
What would you like to see changed in
your field? We need more replications. 
Sometimes, single sensational 
claims may do more harm than good. 
For progress we need systematic 
replication and perhaps a way to collate
failed attempts (even though failures 
can typically be due to any number of 
reasons). Establishing limits can be just
as important as establishing capacities.
Who is important in your career? 
Michael Corballis was a wonderful 
advisor for both my Masters thesis and
my Doctoral work. He is an extremely 
well-rounded academic gentleman, 
who has retained a boyish wonder 
about the world and its quirks. I am 
not sure if I would have persisted with 
an academic career had I not met 
him. The other person I must single 
out is my spouse, Christine Dudgeon, 
who is actually the real biologist in 
our family. She studies sharks in their 
natural environment and examines 
their genetics and ecology. One 
nonhuman I would like to mention is the
chimpanzee Ockie — one of the animal
stars in my book — who sadly passed 
away the month it was published.
Which aspect of science, your field or 
in general, would you wish the genera
public knew more about? Evolution. 
Naturally, I think that the questions 
that drive my research, Where we 
come from, what we are and where 
we are going, are rather important. 
By demystifying our curious place in 
nature, I hope science can contribute 
to a more enlightened self-awareness 
than the traditional views about our 
special roles that continue to fuel so 
many conflicts on this planet.
Science increasingly allows us to 
gain a better understanding of the 
long-term consequences of our action. 
Once aware of these consequences 
we become morally responsible to 
take them into account. We must 
cooperate more to conserve habitats 
and biodiversity. I am particularly 
concerned about the future of our 
closest remaining animal relatives. 
I like the pun “Plan it for the apes” — 
because we can.
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